



2025/2435

2.12.2025

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2025/2435

of 1 December 2025

implementing Article 12(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1770 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1770 of 28 September 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 12(1) and (4) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 28 September 2017, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2017/1770.
- (2) On 13 December 2021, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2021/2201 ⁽²⁾ to give effect to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2208 ⁽³⁾, which amended Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 ⁽⁴⁾ and established a new framework providing for the imposition of additional restrictive measures against individuals and entities responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged, directly or indirectly, in actions and policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of Mali, or that are obstructing or undermining the successful completion of Mali's political transition.
- (3) The Council has reviewed the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies in Annex Ia to Regulation (EU) 2017/1770. On the basis of that review, the reasons in the entries for the persons included in that list should be amended.
- (4) Regulation (EU) 2017/1770 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex Ia to Regulation (EU) 2017/1770 is replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 1 December 2025.

For the Council

The President

K. KALLAS

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 251, 29.9.2017, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1770/oj>.

⁽²⁾ Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2201 of 13 December 2021 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1770 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali (OJ L 446, 14.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2201/oj>).

⁽³⁾ Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2208 of 13 December 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali (OJ L 446, 14.12.2021, p. 44, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2021/2208/oj>).

⁽⁴⁾ Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 of 28 September 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali (OJ L 251, 29.9.2017, p. 23, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2017/1775/oj>).

ANNEX

‘ANNEX Ia

List of natural or legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2b:

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
1.	DIAW, Malick	<p>Place of birth: Ségou</p> <p>Date of birth: 2.12.1979</p> <p>Nationality: Malian</p> <p>Passport number: B0722922 valid until 13.8.2018</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: President of the National Transition Council (legislative organ of the political transition of Mali), Lieutenant General</p>	<p>Malick Diaw is a key member of Colonel Assimi Goïta’s inner circle. As chief of staff of the third military region of Kati, he was one of the instigators and leaders of the 18 August 2020 coup alongside Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué, Colonel Assimi Goïta, Colonel Sadio Camara and Colonel Modibo Koné.</p> <p>Malick Diaw is therefore responsible for actions or policies that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali.</p> <p>Malick Diaw is also a key actor in the context of the political transition of Mali, as President of the National Transition Council (CNT) since December 2020. On 16 October 2024, Malick Diaw was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General “3 star” by the Council of Ministers of Mali.</p> <p>The CNT failed to deliver in good time on the “missions” enshrined in the Transition Charter of 1 October 2020 (“Transition Charter”) and that should have been completed within 18 months, as illustrated by the CNT’s delay in adopting the draft electoral bill.</p> <p>That delay contributed to delaying the organization of the elections and thus the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. In addition, the new electoral bill, as eventually adopted by the CNT on 17 June 2022 and published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Mali on 24 June 2022, allows the Transition President and Vice-President and the members of the Transition Government to be candidates for the presidential and legislative elections, in contradiction with the Transition Charter.</p> <p>Malick Diaw presided over the session that approved on 3 July 2025 the revision of the Transition Charter granting Assimi Goïta a five-year renewable mandate without elections. The revision of the Transition Charter consolidates the position of Assimi Goïta and the powers of the junta as it does not provide for an immediate obligation to hold elections.</p>	4.2.2022

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
			<p>The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Malick Diaw) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>Malick Diaw is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali.</p>	
2.	WAGUÉ, Ismaël	<p>Place of birth: Bamako</p> <p>Date of birth: 2.3.1975</p> <p>Nationality: Malian</p> <p>Passport number: diplomatic passport AA0193660 valid until 15.2.2023</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: Minister for Reconciliation, Lieutenant General</p>	<p>Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué is a key member of Colonel Assimi Goïta's inner circle and was one of the main actors responsible for the 18 August 2020 coup, alongside Colonel Goïta, Colonel Sadio Camara, Colonel Modibo Koné and Colonel Malick Diaw.</p> <p>On 19 August 2020, he announced that the army had taken power, and he then became spokesperson for the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (Comité national pour le salut du peuple, CNSP). On 16 October 2024, Ismaël Wagué was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General “3 star” by the Council of Ministers of Mali.</p> <p>Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali.</p> <p>As Minister for Reconciliation in the Transition Government since October 2020, Ismaël Wagué was in charge of the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.</p> <p>Through his statement in October 2021 and his perpetual disagreements with the members of the Permanent Strategic Framework (Cadre Stratégique Permanent, CSP), he contributed to the blocking of the Monitoring Committee of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (Comité de suivi de l'accord, CSA), which led to the suspension of CSA meeting from October 2021 to September 2022. That situation obstructed the implementation of that Agreement, which was one of the “missions” of the political transition of Mali, as provided for in Article 2 of the Transition Charter.</p> <p>On 25 January 2024, the Transition Government denounced the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and declared its immediate termination. Since that date, there has been a significant increase in the authoritarian constraints imposed by the Transition Government.</p>	4.2.2022

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
			<p>The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ismaël Wagué) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, and is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali.</p>	
4.	MAÏGA, Ibrahim Ikassa	<p>Place of birth: Tondibi, Gao region, Mali</p> <p>Date of birth: 5.2.1971</p> <p>Nationality: Malian</p> <p>Passport number: diplomatic passport issued by Mali</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: former Minister of Refoundation</p>	<p>Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is a member of the strategic committee of M5-RFP (Mouvement du 5 juin – Rassemblement des forces patriotiques), which played a key role in the overthrow of President Keita.</p> <p>As Minister of Refoundation from June 2021 to November 2024, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga was entrusted with planning the National Consultations for Refoundation (Assises nationales de la Refondation, ANR) announced by Prime Minister Choguel Maïga.</p> <p>Even after being replaced in his role in the government, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga has expressed himself politically and in solidarity with the Malian government, showing that he still maintains close ties with it.</p> <p>Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in line with the Transition Charter, the ANR were announced by the Transition Government as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022.</p>	4.2.2022

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
			<p>As announced by Choguel Maïga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. Following a revised timetable presented in June 2022, providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, the Transition Government announced on 21 September 2023 a further postponement of the elections.</p> <p>On 25 January 2024, the Transition Government denounced the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and declared its immediate termination. Since that date, there has been a significant increase in the authoritarian constraints imposed by the Transition Government.</p> <p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali.</p> <p>ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>As a former Minister, co-founder of Espoir Mali Koura and co-founder of M5-RFP (Mouvement du 5 juin – Rassemblement des forces patriotiques), Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga continues to be an influential and vocal supporter of the Malian junta. Given his public statements, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p>	

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
6.	Ivan Aleksandrovitch MASLOV Иван Александрович МАСЛОВ	<p>Date of birth: 11.7.1982 or 3.1.1980</p> <p>Place of birth: Arkhangelsk / Chuguevka village, Chuguev district, Primorsky territory</p> <p>Nationality: Russian</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Function: former Head of the Wagner Group in Mali</p> <p>Address: Unknown, registered in the town of Shatki, in the Nizhni Novgorod region according to “All eyes on Wagner”</p>	<p>Ivan Aleksandrovitch Maslov was the head of the Wagner Group in Mali, whose presence in the country has expanded since late 2021. The Wagner Group has withdrawn from Mali in June 2025 to be replaced by Africa Corps, the latter reportedly reintegrating most of Wagner’s Russian personnel.</p> <p>Wagner’s presence in Mali has posed a threat to the peace, security and stability of the country. In particular, Wagner mercenaries have been involved in acts of violence and multiple human rights abuses in Mali, including extrajudicial killings, such as the “Moura massacre” at the end of March 2022.</p> <p>As the former local head of the Wagner Group, Ivan Maslov is therefore responsible for the actions of Wagner Group that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, in particular involvement in acts of violence and human rights abuses.</p>	25.2.2023’